Up six points with 2:08 left on the clock, on their own 28 yard line and facing a fourth down with two yards to go, Patriot coach Bill Belichick calls a timeout. After a quick tête-à-tête with his quarterback, he then sends his offense back on the field to try to move the ball two yards and end the game.

This is where I’m going to stop my narrative, because all I want to talk about is the decision. My opinion on the decision doesn’t have anything to do with the results. And frankly, it is inexplicable that for a vast majority of those considering a decision like the one Belichick faced, results matter. As Hall-of-Fame coach Brian Billick put it:

“The lens by which you look through at these things is very narrow. It’s one way. If it works you were right, if it doesn’t you were wrong.”

Looking through this particular lens, Belichick was wrong.

But I have my own lens.

Yesterday, The Cavalier Daily ran a point-counterpoint between two columnists who discussed the decision to attempt to convert a fourth down rather than punt late in the final period of the Patriots-Colts game Sunday night. I don’t agree with either.

The columnist who disagreed with the call will tell you that you have to trust your defense. Have faith in them. Give your defense a chance to win the game.

In fact, a lot of sports analysts have made the argument that Belichick risked damaging the psyche of his defense by not punting in this situation.

Um, excuse me? Aren’t these guys professionals? I’m not saying that going for it was the best decision to win the game, but if it was, should Belichick really let the “psyche” of his defense affect his decision here? Are we, as sports fans, going to start asking our coaches not to bench our quarterbacks for poor performance — so we don’t hurt their feelings? If I’ve quoted Herm Edwards once, I’ve quoted him 1,000 times.

“You play to win the game!”

Damn right. Bill Belichick wanted to win. To hell with how his defense felt. In fact, the defense had its chance when it took the field up 17 points with 14 minutes. left.

If Belichick messed up in this game, it was not deciding to go for it. In my mind, he messed up calling the timeout after third down. He should have already decided whether he was going to go for it if he failed to convert on third-and-2. He should have had the play selected and tried to keep the defense unprepared. In my mind, a timeout “to get your offense set” always favors the defense in the end. Not only could the defense have been caught off-guard, but Belichick could have kept the timeout to use as a challenge if need be.

But what about purely the decision to go for it?

If you read the counterpoint, you can see the other columnist regurgitate some statistics and present an unoriginal argument that claims, mathematically, Belichick made the right call.

To catch the gist of the columnist’s views presented in their original context, check out Joe Posnanski’s recent article in Sports Illustrated. (In actuality, Posnanski derives the core of his statistical analysis from Brian Burke’s “Fifth Down Blog” for The New York Times.)

I have to admit that after reading these writers’ (Posnanski and Burke) takes on the situation, it is hard to disagree with Belichick’s choice. Can’t argue with math, right?

But I think they completely miss the point. Looking at the statistics in hindsight is great — the math pretty much shows that going for it wins the game more often than punting (70 to 78 percent of the time, according to Posnanski, and 70 to 73 percent, according to our weekly columnist).

But this is not the right way to evaluate the decision — not by a long shot. Does anyone think Belichick whipped out his TI on the side of the field and figured this?

“A-ha!” I can imagine him saying as Brady watches. “Look, Tom, mathematically speaking, it’s a no-brainer!”

Absolutely not! Now maybe instinctively Belicheck had a few of these concepts in the back of his head, but even so, they were not the dominating factor. It’s really all fuzzy math, anyway — trying to guess what the odds were that the Patriots convert? Who could possibly understand all the factors that could influence that outcome? Maybe if we get those exact same teams out there and have them run that play 1000 times, then I might buy it. But you want me to believe, even taking historical data into account, that anyone can begin to model the actions of 22 players, five officials and an oblong shaped piece of bacon — even considering it’s in a closed environment, being as it’s in a dome and all?

Almost every situation in professional football is different. This situation was its own, and there will likely be no other like it.

The kind of factors that matter:

How has the Patriots defense been playing?

Based on the last two drives? Not well.

How is the Patriots offense playing?

Well, they have Tom Brady, Randy Moss, Wes Weleker, etc.

What kind of looks are the Colts giving the Patriots?

They had given up 477 yards and three touchdowns up to this point. The Colts had only forced New England to punt four times, and the Pats were averaging 6.6 yards per play.

What has New England been preparing for in practice that week?

Only Belichick could tell you that.

What kind of play does Belichick have to call for this situation?

After the game, he said, “I thought we had a good play.” I’m guessing it’s one he had prepared just for that situation.

What does the guy under center think?

That’s exactly what Belichick wanted to know. He called over his three-time Super Bowl winning, four-time Pro-bowl, MVP quarterback and asked, “can you get it?”

Brady nodded.

“Then go get it.”

Belichick wasn’t thinking that he had an 8 percent better chance of a win if he didn’t punt. He looked at the situation, he knew his players, he knew his offense, he knew the play. He decided that to win the game, their best shot was to go for it.

Any statistics or odds with which you try to model this situation are based on precedent. So I don’t care if the statistics say his team is a million-to-one on converting this first down — because this situation wasn’t like anything in the past.

That’s all there is to this much-debated situation. From his place on the sidelines, Belichick saw that this time, his team’s best chance was to go for it. I’m just glad he had the stones to see it through.