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Woodward's 'Maestro' breaks a few strings, misses key notes

Bob Woodward will probably go down in history as one of America's most influential journalists. In collaboration with Carl Bernstein, Woodward publicized the Watergate scandal and helped to bring down the Nixon presidency. His efforts to reveal the truth may have single-handedly changed the relationship between the media and politics.

Woodward has already been blessed with his 15 minutes of fame. His latest work, "Maestro: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom," represents neither earth-shattering importance nor an erudite treatment of his subject, Alan Greenspan and his reign over the Federal Reserve.

To its merit, "Maestro" does shed a surprising amount of light on a once mysterious and self-consciously secretive organization. The inner-workings of the Fed and its policy-making are depicted with excellent detail, as Woodward takes the reader through the bumpy rides of setting interest rates from 1987-2000. And for non-economic types, Woodward does a pretty decent job explaining how monetary policy works and what the implications are for increasing interest rates or expanding the money supply.

Yet it is a shame Woodward is not an economist himself because his book suffers from a lack of depth on certain issues. The work's treatment of developments over the last decade, including the savings and loan scandals of the late '80s and the Asian financial crises of the '90s, is rather superficial.

Related Links
  • U.S. Federal Reserve Web site
  • Alan Greenspan's

    Profile

  • Amazon.com: Excerpt from Maestro
  •  

    For instance, Woodward describes as necessary the Fed's handling of the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a massive hedge fund. He writes "LCTM's collapse [might] unravel the entire world financial system" but does little to explain how LCTM's collapse would destroy financial entities across the world. And he omits any criticisms of the so-called "too-big-to-fail policy" in favor of Greenspan's way of thinking.

    What is most egregious about Woodward's work is its failure to point out many of the negative conclusions the details of the work necessitate. The author's editorial on his subject is one of pure praise, as he attempts to elevate the status of Greenspan to that of a modern hero. The truth is far more complicated than the rose-colored picture Woodward would like to paint.

    One of the scariest points Woodward's book fails to make is that the position of chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is perhaps the most powerful seat of economic policymaking in the United States. Many students of the Fed's operations grow up believing that interest rates are set by the democratic vote of a committee of economists. In reality, the monetary power of the last 13 years has rested in the judgement of one man.

    Greenspan's career epitomized the struggle to push the envelope on limitations to power. The chairman was the master of the FOMC, and before each meeting, he polled and called every member to figure out each one's stance on whether to raise or lower interest rates. Since the chairman always speaks last at an FOMC meeting, Greenspan often could plea for the universal support of his decisions, and his careful rhetoric frequently was enough to achieve the policy outcomes he desired. There were even times from 1988-1999, when the committee voted to allow Greenspan to make minor adjustments in the Fed Funds rate between meetings, giving him complete monetary control.

    We are all lucky that Greenspan has handled the responsibility of his power with such sobriety. What if Greenspan had not been so judicious? An America where the sovereign economic policymaker was a bumbling idiot would resemble the despair of 1929, when interest rates were raised even after the stock markets crashed. The very idea that determining the Fed Funds rate could rest in the hands of a moron is a scary thought.

    Another frightening notion Woodward doesn't elucidate is the number of problems with the way our system allocates its human capital. Many of those on the FOMC were there simply because they had political ties and connections. If Greenspan were to resign tomorrow, party friendships and political allies could influence the new appointment.

    Often when economic policymaking is submerged in politics, short-run prosperity is prioritized, and little thought is given to where things will head five or 10 years down the road. If we had a Fed chairman who - because he is a pawn of politics - strove for break-neck growth without regard to price stability, disaster could occur. Woodward strives to make the point that Greenspan always has tried to put his job above factionalism, but Woodward fails to recognize that future Fed chairmen may not behave the same way.

    Overall, Woodward's "Maestro" gives a decent overview of the history of economic developments and monetary policy in the last decade. The book's flaws lie not in the display of facts but rather in its pure, unquestioning praise of its central figure, Alan Greenspan. I would not disagree with statements that Greenspan has done his job especially well. He, however, has been fortunate, as circumstances beyond his control contributed to the record expansion of our economy and our subsequent prosperity. Greenspan's ability as Fed chairman surely will be tested as our economy slows, and whether we continue to prosper will determine if he really has, as Woodward says, a "mastery of process"

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